Bow-tie analysis is a risk analysis and management tool that has been readily adopted into routine practice in many high reliability industries such as engineering, aviation and emergency services. However, it has received little exposure so far in healthcare. Nevertheless, its simplicity, versatility, and pictorial display may have benefits for the analysis of a range of healthcare risks, including complex and multiple risks and their interactions. Bow-tie diagrams are a combination of a fault tree and an event tree, which when combined take the shape of a bow tie. Central to bow-tie methodology is the concept of an undesired or 'Top Event', which occurs if a hazard progresses past all prevention controls. Top Events may also occasionally occur idiosyncratically. Irrespective of the cause of a Top Event, mitigation and recovery controls may influence the outcome. Hence the relationship of hazard to outcome can be viewed in one diagram along with possible causal sequences or accident trajectories. Potential uses for bow-tie diagrams in anaesthesia risk management include improved understanding of anaesthesia hazards and risks, pre-emptive identification of absent or inadequate hazard controls, investigation of clinical incidents, teaching anaesthesia risk management, and demonstrating risk management strategies to third parties when required.
Introduction
Risk management is an important aspect of anaesthesia practice due to the complex interaction of multiple potential hazards, and the possibility of serious adverse outcomes if these are not prevented or controlled [1] [2] [3] . Risk management has been defined as the 'systematic process for identification, analysis, and control of actual and potential risks and the resource implications' 4 . There are many models on which to base risk management, ranging from industry or general reference models, to clinical models such as the Swiss Cheese model described by Reason 5 . However, none of the currently available models are able to accommodate the multiple influences that contribute to anaesthesia risk.
Bow-tie analysis is a risk evaluation and management tool that has been readily adopted into routine practice in many high reliability industries such as engineering, aviation and nuclear energy [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] . In Australia it is already utilised by the Civil Aviation Safety Authority, State Emergency Services and the Australian Tax Office [11] [12] [13] . It includes both prevention and preparedness aspects, based on the analysis of causes and effects of occupational or industrial accidents. This methodology has recently been introduced into the health industry. Its simplicity, versatility, and logic may lend itself to the analysis of a range of anaesthesia risks, including complex and multiple risks and their interactions. In this article, we briefly describe bow-tie diagrams and speculate on how they might be useful for the analysis of anaesthesia incidents and risks.
Bow-tie methodology
The exact origin of bow-tie methodology is unclear, but it is mentioned as early as 1979 in a hazard analysis course presented by Imperial Chemical Industries at the University of Queensland 14 . The Royal Dutch Shell Group integrated bowtie diagrams into their business practices in 1990 following the introduction of the Seveso Directive and in response to the Piper Alpha North Sea oil rig explosion 15 . The Seveso Directive involved legislation passed by the European Union in response to an accidental release of dioxin in the town of Seveso, Italy, in 1976. The legislation aimed to ensure that prevention and preparedness measures were being taken to avoid further incidents at major industrial facilities.
Bow-tie diagrams represent the fusion of a fault tree and an event tree 16, 17 . Fault trees are a method of identifying and analysing factors that contribute to a particular undesired or critical event, often referred to as a 'Top Event' 16, 17 . A Top Event is the undesired state we are aiming to prevent; it implies loss of control of a hazard 16, 17 . Fault trees were developed at Bell Laboratories in 1962 to evaluate the reliability of an intercontinental ballistic missile launch system 18 . Event trees are a form of consequence analysis, another pictorial technique, which was developed during nuclear reactor hazard studies in the 1970s 19 . Event trees display the aggravating or mitigating events that may occur in response to the Top Event. Fault trees and event trees have each been evaluated as separate methodologies in patient safety 20 .
When a fault tree and an event tree are combined, a causal chain is formed through the Top Event. The fault tree or left-hand side is wedge-shaped, consistent with multiple different and interacting causes, with gradually decreasing options for prevention as the hazard progresses toward the undesired event. In contrast, the event tree or right-hand side is fan-shaped, consistent with the wide range of potential outcomes, depending on the efficacy or otherwise of mitigation and recovery measures instituted. The combination is in the shape of a bow tie 21 , giving bow-tie methodology its name.
The advantage of a bow-tie diagram is that it can display any of the factors that can influence outcome, from potential hazards and prevention measures, through to mitigation resources and recovery plans. By including the fault tree and event tree in the same diagram, the importance of both prevention and preparedness are highlighted. Also the Top Event appears in the centre of a causal sequence, rather than at its end, so that mitigation and recovery controls receive appropriate emphasis.
Bow-tie analyses are primarily qualitative. However, they can be used to support quantitative studies where the frequency of various hazards and outcomes are considered, along with efficacy or otherwise of control measures. While the left side of a bow-tie reflects the vulnerability of a system, the righthand side reflects its resilience 22 . Each control can be assessed for its effectiveness, specificity and reliability, and compliance of personnel with its implementation can be gauged.
Bow-tie methodology in healthcare
Despite its uptake by many other high reliability organisations, bow-ties have had relatively little use so far in healthcare. An article published in 2009 explored the use of bow-ties in the field of medication safety 23 . The method involved multidisciplinary small group discussions over multiple sessions in two tertiary hospitals in the Netherlands.
Top Events were derived from interviews with experts in the field prior to group sessions taking place. Assessment of the bow-tie methodology was based on a survey of discussion participants. In an adjusted strategy, participants prioritised risks before constructing bow-ties. They found that Top Events were more precisely formulated making analyses easier and more relevant 23 . Participants reported that the methodology appeared applicable and comprehensible. Importantly, it was reported that bow-tie diagrams made it easier for non-technical persons to understand the goals and challenges of other disciplines. The intensive care unit from one of these hospitals presented posters at scientific meetings in 2010 and 2011 using bow-tie diagrams for prospective risk analysis of in-hospital patient transportation and unplanned extubation of intensive care unit patients 24, 25 . The analyses were performed using proprietary software (BowtieXP, CGE Risk Management Solutions, Leidshendam, the Netherlands). The authors indicated that bow-ties were easy to perform and provided clear visual insight. Notably, the analyses undertaken resulted in several recommendations and changes to clinical practice, including adjustment to protocols and equipment. The 2011 poster was followed up by publication of the full article in 2013 26 .
Modification of bow-tie methodology for anaesthesia risk management
The first use of the bow-tie concept in anaesthesia was by Culwick at an Australian and New Zealand College of Anaesthetists Annual Scientific Meeting in 2012 27 . He replaced the term 'cause' with 'risk', and modified 'preventive controls' to include 'barriers', and 'recovery controls' to include 'methods' 27 . However, as bow-tie analysis is both flexible and versatile, it supports further modification as necessary to encompass additional concepts and insights about risk. For example, the term 'hazard' can replace 'risk' and 'outcome' can replace 'consequence'. Moreover, prevention controls can be further subcategorised into 'barrier controls', which attempt to prevent or minimise patient exposure to a hazard, and 'escalation controls', which are used to 'detect and correct' in the event that all barrier controls are breached. Similarly, the right-hand side of the bow-tie can be divided into mitigation controls, which are supportive measures, and recovery controls, which are more specific treatments once a diagnosis is made. A generic bow-tie diagram can accommodate the full scale of possible scenarios in anaesthesia practice, including the range of potential outcomes, which will depend on the type of Top Event and the efficacy or otherwise of the controls in place ( Figure 2 ).
Components of anaesthesia bow-tie diagrams
The factors displayed on a bow-tie diagram are already well-recognised components of risk management. They have been discussed in detail extensively in many previous articles and texts. Only a brief summary will be provided here.
Hazards
A hazard is a 'circumstance or agent that can lead to harm, damage or loss' 2 . Every anaesthetic is associated with some degree of hazard. This may be drug-related, equipment-or monitoring-related, or a consequence of the unavoidable effects of anaesthesia on normal protective and homeostatic mechanisms. The terms 'hazard' and 'risk' are not synonymous. A hazard may be mild, moderate, or severe, depending on the potential harm that may result. Risk refers to the probability of patient exposure to a hazard, the probability of harm if exposure occurs, the severity of the potential harm, or some combination of probability and severity, which can be assessed in a matrix 2 . A hazard can be considered a source of risk.
Barrier controls
Barrier controls are measures designed to prevent or minimise patient exposure to a hazard.
These include preoperative patient assessment, planning and optimisation, along with preoperative checks of facilities, equipment and monitoring. There is also an emphasis on adequate resources, communication, and teamwork. More specific strategies include protocol-related practices such as completion of the World Health Organization Surgical Safety Checklist or an equivalent 28 , standard equipment checks, colour-coded labelling of syringes and infusions 29 , and 'team time out' practices 30 . The aim of a barrier control is to prevent patient exposure to a hazard.
Escalation controls
Barrier controls alone are not sufficient to prevent Top Events, because they may be breached due to factors in the system or by human errors. However, it may still be possible to prevent escalation of the hazard into a Top Event. Much progress has been made in the understanding of system and human factors with the recognition that errors are inevitable, and that measures must be put in place for their early recognition and correction where possible 31, 32 . This requires an emphasis on vigilance with appropriate monitoring and alarms for early detection of adverse physiological changes, and algorithms, protocols, and guidelines for diagnosis and correction of undesired changes in patient variables. In this way hazards that have progressed through barrier controls can be identified through pattern recognition and be corrected while there is still a sufficient margin of patient safety before harm is imminent. For example, if the oxygen saturation or blood pressure gradually falls, there is usually adequate opportunity to identify and correct the cause before a dangerous level of hypoxaemia or hypotension occur.
Top Events
A Top Event is the undesired state we are trying to prevent; it is typically the result of one or more breaches in barrier and escalation controls 1-3 . However, in rare instances it can occur de novo (e.g. a patient with no history of drug allergy who develops anaphylaxis, or a patient with a difficult airway despite a normal comprehensive preoperative airway assessment). In all cases, Top Events are associated with a loss of control of a hazard and are the point of greatest uncertainty. This loss of control can manifest in three ways:
Completed harm. This is harm discovered after the event (e.g. nerve compression injury or intraoperative awareness). The loss of control of the hazard is detected only after the completed harm manifests. While the completed harm can no longer be influenced, steps can be taken to prevent further harm.
Fortuitous no harm. In this form of Top Event there is a period of unrecognised loss of control of a hazard, which exposes the patient to a high risk of serious harm, but fortuitously no harm occurs. Typically, the absence of harm is met with great relief, because the outcome could have been very different. Examples include a retained throat pack without airway compromise discovered when a patient awakes postoperatively, or a missed inadvertent central arterial cannulation without sequelae. The loss of control may eventually be discovered and corrected before harm occurs, or the hazard may dissipate without harm occurring. In either case, there has been a period in which the hazard has been uncontrolled and steps must be taken to avoid the situation being repeated.
A crisis. A crisis refers to a situation in which a patient is exposed to a hazard and immediate and appropriate action is required to prevent serious harm occurring 33 . In this form of Top Event there are pathophysiological changes threatening life, limb, or organ viability, which are recognised contemporaneously. However, even if the changes are severe (e.g. cardiac arrest), they can potentially be fully or partially reversed if appropriate crisis management is instituted immediately. Appropriate crisis management may also be necessary to prevent further deterioration.
Mitigation controls
Mitigation controls are the measures designed to reduce the severity or seriousness of a Top Event. Typical immediate mitigation controls in the event of a crisis are the administration of 100% oxygen, optimisation of fluid therapy, or the use of vasoactive agents to correct haemodynamic disturbances until a diagnosis is made and more specific recovery controls can be employed. Experience, familiarity, and the ability to 'call for help', are also typical mitigation controls. Adequate staff resources (backup or supervision), availability of laboratory and transfusion services, and access to a wide range of resuscitation equipment, drugs, and fluids are also mitigation controls. Mitigation controls may also include access to high dependency or intensive care unit facilities where necessary.
Recovery controls
Mitigation controls alone may provide time for a patient to improve and recover from a crisis if the insult or hazard is self-limiting. However, more specific interventions are often required, which could include the administration of adrenaline for anaphylaxis, drainage of a pneumothorax, administration of a bronchodilator or dantrolene, or creation of a surgical airway in a 'can't intubate can't oxygenate' situation, to name only a few examples. Inherent to being able to implement the correct recovery strategy is the ability to make the correct diagnosis. The use of algorithms and crisis manuals and seeking skilled assistance may help to identify the correct treatment or the most effective supportive therapy.
Efficacy of controls
The efficacy of controls are influenced by human factors, system (latent) factors (i.e. structure, process, and outcome elements 34 ), patient factors, and procedural factors 35, 36 . They include both prevention and preparedness aspects. They may also be subject to chance factors. Chance factors relate to the combined uncertainty of all other factors, known and unknown, making a particular outcome impossible to predict. Inherent in the concept of chance is the recognition that identical breaches of controls will not necessarily result in identical degrees of harm.
Outcome
Depending on the severity of the hazard, the efficacy of controls, and chance factors, the outcome may range from no harm, through to severe harm, which may be temporary or permanent, or may even include death. Moreover, once a Top Event occurs, whether or not harm occurs, there is inevitably an escalation of management with increased use of resources and prolonged length of hospital stay, irrespective of the eventual outcome.
Constructing a bow-tie diagram
Bow-tie diagrams can be constructed using a generic bowtie as a template. This could be a basic generic template as in Figure 2 , or could include prompts and examples (Figure 3) . Ideally, these diagrams should be constructed by a group of individuals who have an interest in the management of the particular hazard. The bow-ties may be developed for individual institutions, or potentially across institutions if consensus can be reached. Different groups can be assigned to different bow-ties for different hazards. Once the hazard has been defined, the possible barrier controls are listed as well as the escalation controls in the event that all barrier controls are breached. The possible Top Event is then defined, along with the relevant mitigation and recovery strategies and recommended crisis management where necessary. Finally, the range of potential outcomes can be identified, along with their causal sequences from the initial hazard.
Bow-tie diagrams can be developed using binary logic gates (e.g. yes or no for control present and successful). On the left-hand side of the bow-tie, the gates can be constructed within each control area, with progression from left to right as all effective controls are breached. On the righthand side of the diagram the logic gates and progression would be based on the efficacy of mitigation and recovery controls, resulting in a wide range of potential outcomes. While this process would follow the bow-tie method used in industry, for most anaesthesia hazards it would soon become unnecessarily complex, with dozens or even hundreds of gates depending on the number and sequence of controls. A more pragmatic approach would be to list the potential or available controls under each control category without recourse to a logic diagram. A simple generic example is presented in Figure 3 . A more specific example for a particular hazard is given in Figure 4 . Whichever approach is taken, once agreement has been reached by the group, feedback can be obtained from other individuals or stakeholders before a final bow-tie for a particular hazard is completed, with a date for review at specified intervals.
Potential use of bow-tie analysis in anaesthesia risk management
There are several potential uses for bow-tie diagrams in anaesthesia risk management. These include: 1. Understanding risks and how they can be prevented or minimised 2. Pre-emptive identification of weaknesses in risk management 3. Investigation of clinical incidents 4. Teaching risk management 5. Demonstration of risk management strategies to other parties The process for developing a bow-tie diagram requires a detailed assessment of hazards and risks, as well as the optimal controls required to prevent or minimise adverse outcomes. This process is likely to promote improved understanding and new insights, which can be shared at a local level or even more broadly, depending on the context under which the bow-tie is developed. Moreover, construction of bow-tie diagrams could lead to the identification of weaknesses in relation to a specific hazard or risk, with the opportunity for pre-emptive correction.
A major use for completed bow-tie diagrams would be for the investigation of clinical incidents. In the context of healthcare, a clinical incident is 'an event or circumstance resulting from healthcare, which could have, or did result in unintended or unnecessary harm to a person, and/or a complaint, loss, or damage' 2 . Any breach of a control is a clinical incident, as is any Top Event, whether or not harm occurs. Using a bow-tie, causal sequences could be examined to pinpoint breaches in one or more controls. This could lead to recommendations on how these breaches could be prevented in future, leading to the introduction of new controls or improvements to current controls. The factors influencing the efficacy of controls could be added to the bow-tie templates to act as prompts during investigation of clinical incidents ( Figure 5 ).
Bow-tie diagrams can also be used to teach both the concepts and the practicalities of risk management. The diagrams can be simplified for staff being introduced to risk management, with greater complexity and detail for groups with particular interests, expertise or responsibility. The various hazards and controls can be outlined and discussed, emphasising the roles of all team members, and the importance of teamwork to ensure optimum outcomes. There is an advantage in having a pictorial display of all relevant factors and influences, with scope for including complex interactions.
Finally, individual clinicians, departments, hospitals, and health administrations may be called upon to demonstrate the strategies they have in place to manage various risks, whether these are occupational risks (e.g. fire), other internal or external emergencies, resources risks, or clinical risks 37, 38 . With a bow-tie diagram on record, the risk management strategy for any particular risk can be easily demonstrated. The same could apply to the demonstration of risk management strategies to medical defence organisations or accreditation bodies.
Discussion
Bow-tie diagrams are a relatively new approach to risk management analysis. They provide a pictorial representation of hazards and strategies to prevent adverse events, as well as the preparedness to deal with adverse events should they occur. Although the merits of pictorial analyses of these types are difficult to grade or compare, the uptake of bowtie diagrams by a wide range of industries suggests that this methodology may have advantages over many other risk management models. Like the engineering, aviation, and defence industries, healthcare operates within socio-technical networks with objectives that rely on human performance, team interactions, and intricate equipment and technology.
Anaesthesia as a specialty has been extremely successful in reducing the impact of both human and system errors on patients presenting with a wide range of risks and comorbidities for a wide range of procedures. This has been due largely to the introduction of effective controls, rather than the elimination of all hazards. However, despite the complexity of current controls, hazards still occasionally progress to incidents, crises, and harm. For this reason more effective techniques to recognise and manage error, or to make procedures as error-proof as possible are desirable. Bow-tie analysis may be one such technique that may assist us to better understand hazards, risks, controls, and errors, and to continue to improve our risk management during anaesthesia. Clinical risk management in anaesthesia currently includes morbidity and mortality reviews, clinical incident reporting, and root cause analysis. These are for most part retrospective and reactive. In contrast, bow-ties offer greater emphasis on proactively identifying and understanding risks with the aim of introducing steps to manage all stages of potential accident trajectories. Moreover, when an incident occurs, bow-ties provide a mechanism of investigating and categorising the incidents, and determining how they might be prevented or better managed in the future. The pictorial display makes risk analyses more explicit and transparent, facilitating teaching and multidisciplinary discussion and making it easier for healthcare providers to understand and respond to the relevant challenges and priorities.
As with any model of a complex system, bow-tie diagrams have shortcomings and cannot be viewed as a comprehensive and accurate model for all hazards and risk scenarios. At best, bow-tie analysis would be an additional tool in anaesthesia risk management. Bow-tie analysis may not be the most appropriate methodology for analysing all forms of risk in anaesthesia. Rather it should be included in the toolbox of available models 39, 40 .
Similarly, the bow-tie diagram we have described may not be suitable for risk management in other situations. For example, in disaster medicine a PPRR (prevention, preparedness, response, recovery) model may be preferred 41, 42 . These terms have different definitions and implications for disaster medicine than they do for anaesthesia. They apply to a range of disasters, both manmade and natural, with potential mass casualties and community disruption, rather than to individual patients under anaesthesia. A separate bow-tie would be required for these and other situations, utilising the same principles, but modified accordingly.
In this article we did not aim to prove that bow-tie diagrams have any more value or merit than other risk management models. Rather, our aim was to describe the methodology in broad terms, and encourage anaesthetists and other perioperative staff to consider the advantages that it might bring to particular aspects of their anaesthesia risk management. All clinicians and organisations should appreciate that risk management involves patient, procedural, human, system and chance factors, and that errors are inevitable. Bow-tie analysis draws attention to opportunities for managing these factors at all stages of an accident trajectory, and that avoiding harm requires effective barrier, escalation, mitigation and recovery controls.
